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Genetically modified seeds have to be approved by biosafety regulators before they can 
be commercialized.  Illegal seeds are, however, common in many developing countries 
including Brazil, China and India.  They potentially pose dangers to biosafety and also 
undermine the intellectual property rights of firms that own the genetically modifed traits.  
Their unchecked spread has been attributed to the near impossibility of enforcement 
when potential violators involve millions of small farmers.  Based on a survey of cotton 
growers in Gujarat, India in 2004, and an examination of the structure of cotton seed 
production this paper finds that the government, in fact, possesed the information and 
means to enforce the law.  A contingent valuation exercise reveals high relative 
valuations for illegal seeds correlated with the perceived costs of pesticide application.  
We discuss how that matters to the political cost of enforcement and to socially optimal 
policies.   
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1.  Introduction 
  The commercial release of transgenic plants and that of foods derived from it 
requires approval from biosafety regulators who are charged with protecting the 
environment and consumers from harmful new organisms.  This is quite unlike plant 
varieties that are the outcome of conventional plant breeding which are either not 
regulated or at best tested for agronomic performance.  As a result, the introduction of 
transgenic products has required the establishment of new institutions, risk protocols and 
legal structures.  This is a complex task especially for developing countries.  The setting 
of risk protocols and procedures requires a careful balance between the needs for 
biosafety and the need for early dissemination of useful technology.
1   
  Biosafety regulations can also have unintended consequences.  Between 2002 and 
2006, only one company in India – MAHYCO Monsantio Biotech (MMB) – had the 
permission to sell the Bt gene implanted in cotton.  This gene protects cotton plants 
against their major pest in India, the bollworm.  The regulations in effect gave MMB a 
monopoly on the sale of legal Bt.    
However, despite the resources and time invested in promulgating new laws and 
setting up new institutions for biosafety, illegal transgenic seeds are found many 
developing countries such as Brazil, China and India (da Silveira and Borges, 2007; 
Huang et. al, 2007, Ramaswami and Pray, 2007, Fukuda-Parr, 2007).  These seeds are 
illegal because they have not gone through biosafety regulation despite being genetically 
                                                 
1 For an analysis of how this trade-off worked out in the Indian context, see Pray, Bengali and Ramaswami, 
(2005).  
  1modified.  Estimates suggest that in some years the bulk of the area planted in transgenic 
crops in developing countries was in fact planted with illegal seeds.  The failure to 
enforce biosafety laws is widespread and demands explanation.   
One view is that infirmities in regulation demonstrate a lack of capacity for 
enforcement of bio-safety laws which is a good reason to delay the  commercialization of 
transgenic plants.  (Sahai, 2005).  This was also the basis of a public interest law suit in 
India that called for a moratarium on field trials of transgenic plants because of 
possibilities of contamination from improperly supervised trials (Rodriguez Vs Union of 
India, 2005).  Another view is that the very large number of small-scale farmers in 
developing countries poses great challenges for enforcement and so ‘command-and-
control’ approaches to regulation are unlikely to work (Nuffield Council (2004)).   
But what if neither is the case?  What if it were possible for governments to 
control illegal seeds, but they decide not to do so?  Then the question becomes why 
doesn’t the government enforce these laws?   Why do they give up on biosafety? In the 
Indian case, the biosafety implications are possibly not that compelling because the 
illegal seeds are simply `underground’ versions of legal seeds carrying the gene and trait.  
However, illegal seeds clearly undermine the intellectual property rights of the 
firms that own the genetically modified trait.  The firm responsible for the innovation 
would receive little or no benefit from the diffusion of the illegal seeds.  By contrast, the 
price of legal seeds includes a technology fee payable to the owner of the genetically 
modified trait.  The enforcement of biosafety regulations contains the essential dilemma 
of intellectual property rights – how does one preserve the incentives for innovators 
without restricting the spread of the innovation?  This is clearly a serious issue because if 
  2governments cannot or will not prevent the spread of illegal seeds, then companies might 
decide not to make available newer seeds as they become available in the future.   
This paper examines these difficulties of regulation in the context of illegal 
transgenic Bt cotton seeds in India.  Based on a survey of cotton growers in Gujarat in 
2004, the paper asks three questions.  The first question is whether the lack of 
enforcement is because of obstacles stemming from smallholder agriculture and the large 
number of growers?  Our analysis of government institutions and the nature of hybrid 
seed production suggests that regulations could have been enforced.  If this is so, why 
was illegal seed allowed?  And thirdly, where does socially optimal policy lie?  Does it 
lie in strict enforcement?  If not, how can India provide for biosafety and structure 
incentives for the development and commercial release of new technologies? 
 
2.  Cotton hybrids and Bt Cotton  
Although India grows all the cotton species – old world cottons (G. Arboreum and 
G. Herbaceum) and new world cottons (G. Hirsutum and G. Barbadense),  the principal 
species that are cultivated are G. Arboreum and G. Hirsutum.  The `desi’ or traditional 
cotton varieties belong to G. Arboreum which are known for their drought tolerance and 
resistance to sucking pests.  On the other hand, new world cottons have long and extra 
long staple and better spinning potential (higher counts) than desi cottons.   
Most cotton in India is now cultivated in the form of G.Hirsutum hybrids.  
Overall, these hybrids account for 70% of all India plantings (Murugkar, Ramaswami and 
Shelar, 2007).   Crosses are possible between varieties of the same species.  Crosses 
across species are restricted to be either within the category of new world cottons or to be 
  3within old world cottons. Intra-hirsutum crosses dominate the hybrid cotton seed market 
in India.   Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat are the leading cotton growing states 
within India.   
The first cotton hybrid H4 was developed by the Gujarat Agricultural University.
2  
H4 and its variants have held sway in Gujarat for a long time.  Among private bred 
hybrids in Gujarat, those from Vikram Seeds have been market leaders till recently 
(Murugkar et. al, 2007).  The private sector does not invest resources in breeding 
varieties as farmers can save and use seed for them for several generations.  With hybrid 
seed, however, second generation (F2) seeds are a genetic mixture (which increases with 
successive generations) and their yields are significantly lower than the first generation 
(F1) seeds.   
As cotton is essentially a self-pollinated crop, the crossing of inbred lines cannot 
be left to natural pollination processes.  In the female line, each individual flower bud is 
emasculated and pollinated by hand.  This has to be done carefully without damaging the 
other flower parts.  The activity is highly labor intensive and requires about 10 times 
more labour than cotton production (Venkateswarulu, 2003).  An alternative and much 
less labour intensive technique is to use male sterile lines through cytoplasmic male 
sterility or genetic male sterility.  However, most hybrids are produced by hand 
emasculation methods.  Gujarat is the leading state in hybrid seed production, followed 
by Andhra Pradesh.  In 2003/04, nearly 55,000 acres were under cottonseed production in 
the country out of which 26,000 were in Gujarat (and 14,000 acres in Andhra Pradesh).
3   
                                                 
2 India was the first country to commercialize cotton hybrids.   
3 Venkataswarlu, (2004) 
  4Bt cotton is a radical departure from conventional plant breeding.  Bacillus 
thuringiensis (Bt) is a soil borne bacterium toxic to insect pests and safe to higher 
animals.  It widely used as a bacterial insecticide.  Cry genes from the bacteria determine 
the action against pests.  These have been transferred by genetic engineering techniques 
to different plants (maize, cotton, vegetables) to confer resistance to pests.  Bt cotton 
offers resistance to an important pest, the American bollworm (Helicoverpa amigera), 
which has developed resistance to all the commonly used insecticides in the country 
(Kranthi and Kranthi, 2004).  In India, the first three Bt cotton hybrids were  approved for 
cultivation in 2002.  In subsequent years, many more Bt cotton hybrids have won 
approval.   
 
3.  The Institutional Structure of Indian Biosafety Regulation 
Indian regulatory institutions have three layers. At the bottom, an institutional 
bio-safety committee (IBC) must be established in any institute using DNA in its 
research. These committees comprise institute scientists and also a member from the 
Department of Biotechnology within the Central government. The IBC can approve 
research done at the institute unless it involves a particularly hazardous gene or 
technique. That type of research must be approved by the Review Committee on Genetic 
Manipulation (RCGM), the next layer of the system. 
The RCGM, within the DBT, regulates agricultural biotech research up to large-
scale field trials. It requests food bio-safety, environmental impact and agronomic data 
from applicants wishing to do research or conduct field trials and gives permits to import 
transgenic material for research. It consists primarily of scientists, including agricultural 
  5scientists, and can request specialists to review cases. Its Monitoring-cum-Evaluation 
Committee monitors field trials of transgenic crops.  
The Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC), under the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests, is the agency that gives permits for commercial production, 
large-scale field trials and imports of transgenic products. Although scientists are 
members of this committee, bureaucrats representing different ministries predominate.  
Besides food and environment safety, the GEAC also requires evidence of agroonomic 
performance and that the variety in question is economically beneficial for farmers.  If an 
approved transgenic event is backcrossed into a new plant variety, the developers of the 
new variety do not have to produce new food safety and environmental data. However, 
they do have to put it through agronomic trials which can take upto two years.   
 
4.  Intellectual Property Rights for Agricultural Innovations  
In India, a formal legal framework for the protection of agricultural innovations is in 
its infancy.  The Plant Variety Protection and Farmer’s Rights Act was passed in 2001.  
This Act provides for plant breeder’s rights, which requires extant and new plant varieties 
to be registered on the basis of characteristics relating to novelty, distinctiveness, 
uniformity and stability.  While the law is on the books, the office accepting applications 
was not operational until 2007.  The private seed industry is starting to file applications 
for protection of hybrids and inbred lines, but it may not be used extensively because the 
rights as they exist are so weak as to provide few incentives for innovation (Srinivasan, 
2004).    
  6The other major change in intellectual property protection has been the change in 
patent laws.  The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
Agreement came into force in WTO member countries in 1995.  This requires member 
countries to comply with stipulated minimum standards for intellectual property rights 
protection.  As a result, India amended its Patent Act in 1999, 2002 and 2005.  The major 
impact of these provisions has been to provide product patents in the area of 
pharmaceuticals.  However, the changes have implications for biotechnology innovations 
as well.  The TRIPs agreement requires that patents be provided for micro-organisms.   It 
is unclear, however, to what extent the Indian law is consistent with this provision.  It is 
also not known how the Indian patent office will choose to define micro-organisms.  Six 
patent applications related to cotton have been filed in India till December 2003 
(Ramanna, 2005).  None have been granted yet.  In their survey of the cotton seed 
industry, Murugkar et.al (2007) conclude that patenting was not an important element of 
the current business environment.  Despite this, however, transnational companies have 
sought to commercialize agricultural biotechnology products in India.  Why?  How could 
they secure their investments without patents?   
 
5.   `De facto’ IPRs and Market Structure 
  The first genetic event to be approved was the insertion of a Bt gene (cry1Ac), 
belonging to Monsanto, in three cotton hybrid cultivars (MECH 12, MECH 162, MECH 
184) belonging to the Indian seed company Mahyco.  This event was commercialized by 
a joint venture called Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (MMB), which is equally owned by the 
two partners.  After backcrossing was done, the first biosafety tests were done in 1997.  
The approval for commercial release came five years later in 2002.  The hybrids were 
  7approved for cultivation in southern, western and central India for a period of 3 years.  In 
2004 and 2005, the government granted permission for the release of several other hybrid 
varieties of Bt cotton.   
MMB has derived a measure of protection for its gene through bio-safety laws.  
The gene itself has not been patented in India.  However, as bio-safety approvals are 
obtained for the composite of the gene and the germplasm, hybrids that incorporate 
MMB’s gene but do not go through the bio-safety process are illegal. While this has not 
stopped the diffusion of illegal Bt seeds, it has led the seed companies wishing to work 
within the law (which includes all the established firms with branded products) to either 
deal with MMB or consider an alternative Bt strategy. At this point, most of the firms 
have chosen to license the Bt technology from MMB.  Although MMB does not hold an 
Indian patent over its gene, the regulatory authorities are unlikely to approve a Bt hybrid 
that incorporates an unlicensed version of the MMB gene.
4  Thus, the biosafety 
regulation creates `de facto’ intellectual property rights for the legal Bt cotton.
5   
Biosafety regulatory processes also constitute an entry barrier for new genes.  
Pray et. al (2005) report the compliance costs of early products that went through the 
regulatory system   These are MMB’s first Bt cotton hybrids and Bayer’s GM mustard 
hybrid.  Compliance costs were found  to be high for MMB and Bayer. In the case of 
MMB, pre-approval costs were about US$1.8 million, of which $300,000 was spent on 
field trials.  The largest value of cotton seed sales from any single firm is in the 
neighbourhood of $30 million per year. 
                                                 
4 It has been told to us that a leading seed company was rebuffed by the regulatory authority when it tried to 
obtain legal approvals for its Bt hybrids with an unlicensed MMB gene.   
5 This has been recognized by others as well.  Herring (2007) points out “Monsanto would prefer the strict 
regulated capitalism promulgated by the state, in which the only legal seeds are its seeds. Market-rigging 
via biosafety rules is preferable for would-be monopolitists.” 
  8Bayer’s compliance costs were even higher, in the range of $4-$5 million. The 
genes used to produce hybrid mustard have been used in canola to produce hybrid canola 
cultivars in Canada and the U.S. where they have cleared the bio-safety regulations. 
However, use of these genes in mustard has not been commercialized anywhere in the 
world. Because of continued costs, uncertainty about whether GM mustard would ever be 
approved and the market potential for this product, Bayer decided not to continue trying 
to commercialize it in India.  Because of the time and money required to  acquire 
approval, the regulatory system serves as a barrier to entry by firms other than those that 
can fund regulatory compliance and have the capacity to negotiate and smoothen 
regulatory risks.
6  
With Bt cotton, the seed industry encompasses a seed market as well as a 
technology market. Until  2006, the technology market consisted of only one supplier – 
MMB, which has licensed its Bt gene to almost all of the leading cotton seed companies. 
For a seed company, licensing Bt and developing a Bt hybrid means a substantial hike in 
R&D investment. However, that has not constituted an entry barrier as more than 20 
firms have licensed Bt genes from MMB. While non-MMB Bt genes have entered the 
market in 2006 in very small amounts, their ability to compete in the technology market 
is handicapped by the first mover advantage of MMB.  As farmer preferences have 
shifted to Bt, seed companies have scrambled to tie up with MMB.  As these companies 
have some of the best performing hybrids in the country, the `lock-in’ with Monsanto 
genes means that the alternative genes would find it hard to find a market.   
                                                 
6 Pray et. al (2005) note that compliance costs have been significantly lower for transgenic plants produced 
by the public research system.   
  9  MMB did exercise its monopoly power as long as it could.  Prior to the 2006 
season, it priced Bt hybrid seed to be four times that of non-Bt hybrids.  On the other 
hand, seed production costs do not differ between Bt and non-Bt hybrids.  In 2006, the 
Andhra Pradesh government cited the high prices of Bt seed (relative to non-hybrids and 
relative to Bt cotton seed elsewhere in the world) as evidence of anti-competitive pricing 
and imposed price controls that halved the price that MMB was able to charge.  Other 
state governments followed.  
  Despite high prices, most research papers have found that growers have gained 
substantially by growing Bt cotton (Bambawale et.al (2004), Bennet et.al (2004), Naik 
et.al (2005), Qaim, (2003)) .  Using conservative estimates thrown up by this literature, 
Ramaswami and Pray (2007) conclude that growers received about two-thirds of the 
gains from Bt cotton while the remainder went to the seed company.  From the point of 
view of public policy, MMB’s market power in the cotton seed market, facilitated in no 
small measure by the government’s biosafety regulatory requirements, may therefore 
seem an acceptable trade-off.  While competitive pricing would generate more gains for 
growers and also greater diffusion, it would also mean that MMB receives no rewards for 
its technology, severely jeopardising incentives for future product development from 
MMB and other potential technology suppliers.   
 
6.  The Diffusion of Illegal Seeds 
The approval to the MMB varieties was preceded by the discovery of an 
unauthorized Bt cotton hybrid in farmers’ fields at the end of 2001 in Gujarat.  The illegal 
seed was NB 151, a variety registered with the Gujarat government as a conventional 
  10hybrid.  The variety belonged to Navbharat Seeds, a firm based in Ahmedabad.  Later 
investigation confirmed that the Bt gene in NB 151 is the Cry 1 Ac gene developed by 
Monsanto and used in the legally approved varieties.   
Navbharat Seeds has been barred from the cotton seed business and has been 
prosecuted for violating the biosafety laws (under environmental protection laws). Yet 
despite this, the multiplication and distribution of the illegal seed continued to spread .  
As can be seen in Table 1, illegal seed plantings have diffused rapidly and covered an 
area larger than under legal seed until 2006.  However, illegal seeds are geographically 
concentrated in Gujarat and can be found to a lesser extent in Punjab and Andhra 
Pradesh.   
Authors like Herring (2007) and Shah (2005) have emphasized the limits of legal 
monopolies in seeds.  They suggest that farmers always have the ability to make “gray-
market” versions of the legal seed.  Herring’s characterization of the proliferation of 
illegal Bt cotton seeds in Gujarat is evocative.  “Neither duped nor passive puppets of 
multinational monopolists, they [cotton farmers] are continuing the primordial struggle of 
agriculture against insects, with a new weapon.  Their techniques continue traditions of 
seed saving, seed exchange, and seed experimentation that have historically produced 
better crops and better incomes.”  Herring sees farmers as possessing “stealth” strategies, 
resulting in an “opportunistic agrarian anarcho-capitalism among farmers themselves” 
that functions “without property or biosafety”.   
If farmers freely experiment, adapt, and exchange seeds, policing the diffusion of 
those seeds that violate property rights or have not received biosafety clearance is 
difficult.  Herring quotes a government official to say  “It is impossible to control 
  11something at this large a scale.  When we go to the fields, we become targets for trying to 
take away a beneficial technology from farmers”.   While this statement admits the 
practical difficulties of enforcing the prohibition against illegal seeds, it also 
acknowledges their popularity among farmers implicitly questioning why such seeds 
should be illegal in the first place.   
What are the “stealth” strategies that farmers use?  In the Indian case, the illegal 
Bt cotton seeds are hybrids.
7  As noted earlier, the seeds that are saved from a crop 
planted with the hybrid seed (the F2 generation) are a genetic mixture and do not have the 
same hybrid vigor and resistance properties as the first generation hybrid seed.  Further 
multiplication reduces performance even further.  So growers desirous of getting 
maximum yields from their crops necessarily have to plant first generation hybrid seed.   
The typical strategy of multiplying and saving seeds does not work with hybrids which is, 
of course, the reason why the private seed industry invests in hybrid seed development 
(as opposed to varieties which can sustain performance across many generations).  As we 
shall see, planting F2 seeds is an important ‘stealth’ strategy for farmers in Gujarat.  
However, a considerable proportion of area is planted as well with illegal F1 seeds.  
Where do farmers get these from?   
As we saw earlier, production of hybrid seed requires access to parent lines and 
the experience and skill in crossing them manually.  Seed companies typically contract 
production of hybrid seed to select seed growers.  The contract fixes a price that will be 
paid to growers.  The company supplies the parent seed and agrees to buy back the seed 
from the crossings at a price that is fixed by the contract.  Growers receive an advance 
usually around a fifth of the price of the seed.   Gujarat as a leading centre of hybrid 
                                                 
7 In this respect, the Indian experience is materially different from that in Brazil and China.   
  12cotton seed production in India has many experienced growers skilled in producing 
hybrid seed.  It is, however, a specialized task requiring more resources (ten times more 
labour and five times more capital) than normal cotton cultivation and growers hire 
labour (often children and young women) for cotton seed production (Venkateswarlu, 
2003)  .   
If this is the picture for legal hybrid seeds, could it be vastly different for illegal 
hybrid seeds?  Would they not require some organization in terms of seed growers, 
capital and most importantly a network for distributing seeds?  Indeed, we did observe 
several seed companies that were active in selling and producing illegal seeds.  Our 
interviews with farmers indicate that they obtained the seeds from “other growers” or 
seed dealers.  The “other growers” that supplied the seed were not the producers of the 
seeds but were sales agents of the producers.  Our fieldwork suggests that illegal Bt 
cotton seed production and sales is not controlled by a single agent but neither is it the 
outcome solely of individual stealth strategies.  Rather the seed is produced through a 
loose network of seed companies, producers and their agents many of  whom were 
former contract seed growers for NavBharat.  It is not clear how many agents in this 
network obtained the NavBharat inbred parental lines– however, ownership of it seems 
fairly dispersed.  As a result, there has been wide experimentation and the male parent 
(with the Bt gene) has been often crossed with different female lines producing a broad 
range of varieties often very well adapted to local conditions.  Although the seed 
producers are careful not to advertise on a wide scale, the illegal seeds are known to 
growers through locally known brand names or as NB 151.   
  13From fieldwork in one district of Gujarat, Shah (2005) finds that illegal seed sales 
happen through two channels.  The traditional channel is through companies which 
produce hybrid seed through contract production.
8  But Shah also finds that seed 
multiplication and sales also occurs through farmers and that parent Bt male seeds were 
available in the market.
9  However, even here Shah cites the importance of access to 
skilled labour (seasonal migrant labour in this case) for seed production.  Shah also finds 
that illegal seeds move from seller to buyer through social networks that offered trust to 
the parties in the transaction.   
The underground seed economy does not seem anarchic or devoid of 
organization.  Hybrid seed production demands specialization which immediately implies 
a structure for their distribution.  The traditional strategies of saving seed and modifying 
them to local conditions do not work with hybrid seeds.  As Roy, Herring and Geisler 
(2007) demonstrate, farmers actively evaluate and experiment with different types of 
cotton seeds, whether with respect to pest resistance or with respect to their soil and water 
endowments.  The point is that the diffusion of illegal seeds rested not so much on 
individual stealth strategies but on a stealth economy to use Herring’s terminology.  This 
economy includes farmers as well as seed growers, seed companies and distribution 
agents.  The government official quoted by Herring was surely right in suggesting that 
illegal seeds could not be curbed by penal action against millions of growers.  However, 
seed produces and seed companies are, in comparison, a much smaller and finite number 
                                                 
8 Shah states that growers are supplied with 240 grams of Bt male and 600 grams of the parent female 
(usually from GujCot 8 line) are supplied for one acre which produces anywhere between 100 to 300 kgs of 
seed.   
9 These would not be of much use to growers, however, unless they are breeders as well.   
  14and the problem of enforcement is not as serious as suggested by the government official.  
The government posseses the information and means to enforce the law.   
It is the responsibility of state governments to prosecute violations of biosafety 
law.  Through India’s seed laws, the state governments have wide coercive powers to 
raid, inspect and seize seed supplies except for farmer-to-farmer exchange of seeds. This 
loophole has allowed the state government to claim ignorance of the extent of illegal 
plantings.  For their part, illegal seed sales try to soften their challenge to the law by 
taking care to mask the seed sales as seed exchange.  The illegal seeds are often sold 
loose in packets without a company seal and without a bill of purchase.  If enforcement is 
not the issue, why has the state government chosen to turn a blind eye to illegal seeds?   
Our hypothesis is that the illegal seed is highly profitable to farmers, that they see 
environmental and health benefits rather than problems from the illegal seed, and as a 
result state governments have strong political incentives to do nothing.   
 
7.  Data  on the impact of illegal and legal Bt cotton on farmers  
None of the published studies of Bt cotton have separated the impact of legal and 
illegal Bt cotton on farmers.  So we set out to collect this type of data in 2004. Our data 
comes from a stratified survey of 160 randomly picked cotton growers in the districts of 
Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Bharuch and Vadodara.   In each district, 4 talukas were chosen 
randomly and within each taluka 2 villages were chosen randomly.  In each village, a 
listing of cotton growers was made out of which 5 growers were picked randomly.  The 
survey was conducted during April-May of 2004 and the information collected pertain to 
the Kharif season of 2003/04 which in some cases ended as late as March 2004.   
  15Nearly three quarters of the sample growers of the sample grow Bt.  Most of these 
Bt growers (82% ) do not grow any other type of cotton.  As many as 57% of the Bt 
growers planted Bt for the first time in the 2003/04 season.  As for the non-Bt users, 
about 20% of them used Bt in the past.  The rate of entry into the ranks of Bt growers is 
far higher than the exit from these ranks.  The response to a question about when in the 
past growers began to plant Bt revealed that significant use of Bt cotton began from 2002 
onwards.  In terms of number of growers, illegal Bt dominates Bt plantings.  71% of Bt 
growers grow illegal Bt only; 13% grow the legal MMB Bt varieties only; while the 
remainder 16% use both types.  85% of cotton farmers spray pesticide.  Most of the 
pesticide application is by manual means and often uses family labour.   
  Almost all farmers in the sample have heard about Bt cotton.  Media, government 
extension services, company propaganda and seed sellers tend to be unimportant sources 
of information relative to fellow farmers, neighbours and friends.  Thus, the formal 
information sources are not as important as the informal network.  Consistent with this, 
very few growers report a visit by government officials or company representatives.   
 
8.  Varietal-wise Comparisons 
We have area, yield and seed price information for each cotton variety that is 
grown by the farmers in the sample.  Our sample of 160 farmers grew 50 distinct cotton 
varieties and some farmers grew more than one variety.
10  The distribution of area under 
the principal cultivars is in Table 2.  As noted earlier, illegal Bt varieties go by different 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that here we are going by farmer reported variety names.  If a variety has different 
names in different regions, then the number of distinct varieties would be less than number of distinct 
names.   
  16names and include F2 generation hybrid seed.  Indeed, Navbharat F2 seed is widely used 
– on as much as 20% of cotton area.     
In our sample, 55% of the cotton area is planted with Bt varieties – illegal seeds 
are predominant, accounting for 43% of area (Table 3).  While Bt cotton plots tend to be 
smaller than non-Bt plots, the proportion of area that is irrigated is significantly higher.  
However, there is no significant difference in soil quality. Table 3 also shows that legal 
seeds are almost entirely procured from seed dealers while non-Bt seeds are obtained 
from a variety of sources that include seed dealers (the most important source) but also 
from state seed corporation, other farmers, and self-saved seed.  For illegal seeds, other 
farmers are the most important source.  As discussed earlier, leading growers in a locality 
often tend to be the agents of distribution of illegal seeds.   
Table 4 compares household size, its composition, age profile and education 
across growers of non-Bt seeds, legal Bt seeds and illegal Bt seeds.
11  This table 
demonstrates that there are no significant differences in terms of household demographic 
characteristics between the growers of different kinds of cotton varieties.   
  Table 5 compares input use and yields across a five fold classification of cotton 
varieties – desi varieties, non-Bt hybrids, legal Bt hybrids, illegal Bt hybrids (excluding, 
however, F2 seeds) and illegal Bt F2 seeds.  As expected, seed costs are highest for legal 
Bt seeds and lowest for desi varieties.  The illegal Bt seed (excluding F2 seeds) costs as 
much as 68% of the legal Bt seed.  Contrary to what is generally conjectured, the illegal 
F1 Bt seed is not much cheaper than the legal Bt seed.  It is the illegal Bt F2 seeds which 
are inexpensive and much cheaper than the non-Bt hybrid seed.   
                                                 
11 Note that corresponding sets of growers are not disjoint – for instance, a grower might grow a legal Bt 
variety as well as an illegal Bt hybrid.   
  17  As remarked earlier, in a competitive market, if there were no monopoly over the 
Bt technology, the price of Bt hybrid seed would be comparable to the price of non-Bt 
hybrid seed (assuming that with free entry there are no shortages of preferred seeds).
12  
While MMB was the only supplier of legal Bt seeds in 2004, the situation as we 
described in an earlier section, was decidedly murky for illegal seeds.  There seemed to 
be a multitude of suppliers as well as a number of variants of the basic NB 151.  
Referring to this, Roy, Herring and Geisler (2007) commented “In Gujarat, something 
like the obverse of monopoly is evident in the fields – a rare competitive market”.  Yet, 
as table 5 shows, the illegal Bt seeds in 2004 still cost more than three times as much as 
non-Bt hybrids.   
  This strongly suggests that the market for illegal Bt seeds was anything but 
competitive.  Whether because of the ownership of parent lines or because of the 
distribution network (and the ownership of `trust’ that is necessary to operate it), 
suppliers of illegal Bt possessed market power.
13  This also confirms that the diffusion of 
illegal Bt cannot just be due to farmer reproduction and exchange.   
Legal Bt cotton growers seem to practice more intensive agriculture than the other 
cotton growers.
14  They use more fertiliser and pesticides than either the illegal Bt cotton 
growers or the non-Bt category.  There is no significant difference between pesticide 
costs of illegal and non-Bt cotton fields.  Thus, pesticide savings which have been an 
important source of benefits from Bt cotton seem to be absent for Gujarat producers.   
                                                 
12 On the other hand, a competitive market would not recoup the costs of R&D and would therefore provide 
no incentives for it.  This does not apply to the illegal seeds producers, however, as they have not incurred 
the costs of developing the Bt seed.   
13 Fieldwork in subsequent years indicate that the entry of more legally approved hybrids have led prices of 
illegal seeds to come down.   
14 In their study of pesticide use in Shandong province of China, Pemsl, Waibel and Gutierrez (2005) 
similarly report that “farmers who pay more for their seed also spend more money on insecticides and other 
inputs” 
  18When measured by number of sprays, however, growers spray fewer times against 
bollworms on Bt cotton fields (whether legal or illegal) than on non-Bt cotton.  Also, as 
expected, there is no difference between the groups with regard to sprays against other 
insects which confirms similar findings in Qaim (2003), Bennett et. al (2004).   
  Average yields of Bt cotton, whether legal or illegal, whether F1 or F2, are 
significantly higher than yields of non-Bt hybrids.  The yield advantage of legal Bt 
hybrids is about 50%, while that of illegal F1 Bt hybrids is over 70%.  Even the average 
yield of F2 Bt hybrids is higher than that of non-Bt hybrids by more than 10%.  This 
pattern in yield differences persist even after we controlled for differences in land quality, 
inputs and locations.  We do not report these regressions.   
The tables are revealing about the economics of the choice between non-Bt 
hybrids and illegal F2 generation Bt seeds.  The latter is higher yielding, is a cheaper seed 
and needs less pesticide application than the former.  In other words, illegal F2 Bt seeds 
dominate non-Bt hybrids in performance and cost.  Similarly, the economics of the 
choice between legal and illegal F1 hybrids seems quite transparent.  While the two 
variety types have similar yields and thus similar revenues, costs whether for pesticides, 
seeds, or fertilizers are substantially lower for illegal hybrids.  The popularity of illegal 
varieties is therefore not hard to explain.  Note that the higher yields of Bt varieties need 
not necessarily be due to the Bt trait alone; the popular non-Bt hybrids are the public 
sankar hybrids while the Bt varieties might have a better genetic background.   
  19 
9.  Farmer’s Valuation of Bt Seeds:  Bid Design and Methodology 
The above findings are based on data from a single year and its robustness to 
varying weather conditions and pest infestations is open to question. In a world where 
farmers choose between seed alternatives based on what maximizes their returns, the 
valuation of these seeds by farmers would reflect their cumulative experience and would 
therefore be useful to validate the performance analysis.    
Stone (2007) has argued, however, that this need not be the case.  From an 
analysis of seed choices in some villages of Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh, he 
concludes that seed choices can be driven by fads that have little grounding in considered 
evaluations of payoffs from various seeds.
15  This suggests that it is not just enough to 
elicit farmer’s valuations, but they must be systematically correlated with grower 
characteristics and technology perceptions if they are to be something more than random 
noise.   
To do this, we undertook parallel contingent valuation exercises for both legal and 
illegal seeds.
16  For legal seeds (from Mahyco Monsanto), the bid design consisted of an 
initial question where all growers were asked whether they were willing to use these 
seeds (for the next season) at the prevailing price of  Rs. 1600 per packet.
17  If a grower 
responded in the negative, then, then he was offered one of 6 distinct prices (Rs. 1000 to 
Rs. 1500 in Rs. 100 increments) chosen randomly.   Thus, we have 3 possible responses:  
Yes; No, Yes and No, No.  Nearly 26% of all growers were willing to pay Rs. 1600 per 
                                                 
15 Stone does not suggest that fads drive seed choices everywhere and at all times.  In particular, he 
acknowledges that Bt cotton in Gujarat might have greater grounding in farmer knowledge and learning. 
16 For a previouis application of contingent valuation methods to Bt cotton, see Qaim and de Janvry (2003).  
Our bid design is different from theirs.   
17 A packet consists of 450 grams of seed. 
  20packet.  The sub-sample of growers not willing to pay Rs. 1600 were then asked the 
follow up questions.  A key  difference from the usual contingent valuation application, is 
that not everything is hypothetical here.  In particular, as the legal seed sold at Rs. 1600 
for a packet, this price is likely to be fixed in the minds of responders as an upper bound 
on the willingness to pay.  We therefore, begin, by asking about willingness to pay at Rs. 
1600.  If the person answers yes, there are no further questions while if the person 
answers no, he/she receives a second question with a lower bid price.   
The survey also posed willingness to pay questions regarding illegal F1 seeds 
(Navbharat 151 and its variants).  This module consisted of two questions corresponding 
to the usual double-bound contingent valuation methods.  The first question asked 
whether the grower was willing to pay Rs. X for F1 illegal seed where X was randomly 
varied between Rs. 900 and Rs. 1500 (the randomization was independent of the random 
price that confronted the grower in the valuation for legal seeds).  If the grower 
responded negatively, the bid price was dropped to Rs. 800.  If the grower responded 
positively to the first question, the bid price was raised to Rs. 1600.   
To determine the correlates of grower’s valuations, suppose that  j j j x W ε β + = , 
where   is the willingness to pay (WTP) of the ith individual for legal seeds, xi are the 
correlates that are observed by the econometrican and εi captures the correlates that are 
not observed by the econometrician.  It is assumed that each individual receives a 
particular εi that is drawn from a specified distribution.  The goal is estimate the beta 
parameters and recover the distribution of WTP.  This is done by considering the 
likelihood of observing the given data of responses.  For the legal seeds, the probabilities 
of the three responses are:  
i W
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where the I’s are indicator variables for each of the responses. 
Following the exercise for legal seeds, specify the willingness to pay (for illegal 
seeds) by the jth grower as  j j j X Z η γ + = .   Here we have four possible response 
sequences: (Yes, Yes); (Yes, No); (No, Yes); and (No, No).  The likelihood of each of 
these responses can be written as: 
(i)   = ) , ( Pr Yes Yes ob ) 1600 ( Pr ) 1600 ( Pr > + = > j j j x ob Z ob η γ = 
) / 1600 ( 1 ) 1600 ( Pr σ γ γ η j x j j x ob − Φ − = − >   
(ii)  = ) , ( Pr No Yes ob ) ( ) 1600 ( ) 1600 ( Pr j j j t F F Z t ob − = < <
) / (
 = 
) / 1600 ( σ γ σ γ j j x t − j x Φ − − Φ  and  
(iii) ) , ( Pr Yes No ob ) / 800 ( ) / ( ) 800 ( Pr σ γ σ γ j j j j j x x t t Z ob − Φ − − Φ = < < =  and  
(iv)  =  =  ) , ( Pr No No ob ) 800 ( Pr < j Z ob ) / 800 ( σ γ j x − Φ  
  22Table 6 summarizes the responses from both contingent valuation exercises.  In the case 
of legal seeds, there are a large number of (No, No) responses suggesting that there 
should have been bid prices lower than the minimum of Rs. 1000.  In the case of illegal 
seeds, there is the opposite problem as there are a large number of (Yes, Yes) responses.  
From Table 6, it is clear that the average willingness to pay is likely to be substantially 
greater for illegal seeds.   
 
10.  Farmer’s Valuations of Bt Seeds: Estimates and Correlates 
Table 7 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables that are used as 
correlates of the willingness to pay.   Farm size is a proxy for wealth.  Land quality is 
measured by the proportion of cotton area that is irrigated as well as the proportion of 
cotton area that is of `good’ soil quality.  The wealth and land quality variables would be 
expected to increase a grower’s willingness to pay for Bt seeds.  Farmer characteristics 
include age, education, and experience.  It is not clear a priori how these would be 
correlated with willingness to pay.  If Bt seeds are seen as an expensive and risky 
investment, then a grower’s valuation would be negatively correlated with age and 
positively with education and experience.   
As Bt seeds are much more expensive than legal seeds, a farmer’s willingness to 
pay for them might be expected to be positively correlated with his access to credit.  To 
proxy this, we construct a dummy for growers who have received a crop loan.  Another 
variable that also proxies the credit constraint is the area under cotton for that grower.  As 
area increases, other things remaining equal, it calls for greater upfront investment by 
growers in terms of seeds and other costs.  If the grower is credit constrained, he typically 
  23opts for extensive cultivation and lowers the expenditure on inputs per acre of land.  
Thus, we would expect the crop loan dummy to be positively correlated and the cotton 
area to be negatively correlated with willingness to pay.   
The Bt technology is expected to reduce pesticide use.  If so, growers might value 
this technology depending on whether they used pesticides and whether they hired 
somebody to spray it or did it themselves.  The discomfort with these actions would in 
turn depend on their beliefs about the impacts of pesticide use on the environment and on 
the health of workers who handle it.  Responses from these questions are used as 
correlates of willingness to pay.   
The impact of these correlates on the willingness to pay for legal seeds is 
summarized in Table 8.  The willingness to pay (WTP) for legal seeds increases with 
farm size although at a decreasing rate.  Irrigation and good soil quality also increase the 
WTP for legal seeds.  Farmers perceive the Bt hybrids as water sensitive and as these 
seeds are expensive (relative to non-Bt seeds), they prefer not to use them on unirrigated 
lands.  Education has a surprisingly negative effect on the valuation of legal seeds.  The 
access to credit variables have the expected sign but statistical significance is clear only 
for the cotton area variable.  Although experience in cultivating cotton turned out to be 
insignificant (and not included in the likelihood estimation reported here), experience 
with Bt cotton (whether planted Bt in the past) contributes positively to WTP.  On the 
other hand, experience with Navbharat Bt dampens valuations.   
Farmers have a higher valuation of legal Bt if a family member applies 
insecticides or if they believe that pesticides impact the environment (such as reducing 
the number of beneficial insects or through land degradation).  Controlling for these 
  24variables, the dummy for whether a farmer believes pesticides have an impact on health 
is not significant.  The last column of Table 8 reports the betas, i.e., the marginal impact 
of the correlates on the willingness to pay.  The variables that have a large positive 
impact are irrigation, experience with Bt, access to credit, the pesticide use variables and 
the subjective perceptions of their impact.  The variables that have a sizeable negative 
impact are education and the experience of the grower using Navbharat seeds.   
The coefficient estimates can be used to compute and predict the expected 
willingness to pay of each individual in the sample.  For the sample, the mean value of 
this variable is Rs. 778 and the median is Rs. 880.  These estimates imply that legal seeds 
are overpriced and therefore have not been adopted widely.
18 
  Table 9 reports the estimates of the WTP function for illegal F1 seed (Navbharat 
151 and its variants).  Many of the variables significant in the WTP equation for legal 
seeds are insignificant here.
19  The wealth variable (farm size) is not significant at the 5% 
level and the coefficient associated with it has a relatively negligible impact on WTP (see 
last column of Table 9).  Irrigation has a strong positive and significant impact.  The 
marginal impact is bigger than what we observe in the case of WTP for legal seeds.  
Good soil quality has also a postive but not statistically significant impact.  A variable 
that is significant here is whether the grower sprays pesticides.  This was insignificant in 
the WTP for legal seeds.  This variable has a negative sign indicating those who do not 
spray pesticides have a substantially higher valuation of illegal seeds.  Like in the case of 
legal seeds, willingness to pay is higher for growers who sprayed pesticides themselves 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that during the time of study, the only legal seeds were the varieties from Mahyco 
Monsanto and this finding applies to them.  In later years, other legal Bt varieties have become available. 
19 This happens because there is not enough variation in the dependent variable because of the large number 
of the (Yes, Yes) responses that was noted earlier.   
 
  25or with the help of family members and growers who believed that pesticides have an 
adverse impact on the environment and health.  Thus, like in the case of legal seeds, a 
large chunk of the valuation of Bt seeds comes from the fact that growers value the 
reduction in pesticide use.   
  The mean WTP for illegal F1 seeds is as high as Rs. 3050.  This is because of the 
large number of growers who report they are willing to pay at least Rs. 1600.  As Rs. 
1600 is the price at which legal seeds are sold, there could be an anchoring bias as 
growers could have perceived the question as eliciting a comparison between the illegal 
F1 seed and the MM seed.  We also estimated the WTP function based on the first 
response alone.  The likelihood function, on the assumption of normal distribution for 
disturbances, reduces to a probit model.  The signs and magnitudes of the individual 
coefficients are in line with the earlier estimates.  However, the mean WTP based on this 
model is much lower at Rs. 1975 which, however, is still substantially higher than the 
average WTP for illegal seeds.     
 
11.  Conclusions 
  Illegal Bt cotton varieties have diffused widely in the Indian state of Gujarat and, 
according to media reports, have spilled across the state boundaries as well.  Their 
unchecked spread has been attributed to the near impossible task of monitoring and 
enforcing the law when potential violators involve millions of small farmers.  Some 
critics of biotechnology have this seen as proof of weak regulatory capacity and reason 
enough for India not to permit the cultivation of genetically modified crops. 
  26  In this paper, we have argued that the absence of enforcement of biosafety laws 
does not indicate the lack of means on the part of government.  As the production and 
distribution of illegal seeds is coordinated by a network of seed companies, seed 
producers and seed dealers, enforcement is not difficult.  The chain from seed plots to 
seed sales can be disrupted at any point.  The lack of enforcement is an act of choice by 
the state governments.   
  The federal structure of government means that while biosafety approvals and 
laws are in the domain of the Central government, the task of enforcing the laws lies with 
the state government.  As this paper shows, illegal seeds perform just as well as legal 
seeds, if not better.  Farmers value them highly and their valuations are strongly 
correlated with their aversion to pesticides.  Enforcing the law would be unpopular with 
cotton growers.  Why should the state government court such unpopularity?   
Furthermore, the Bt gene contained in the illegal varieties (cry 1 Ac) is the same 
as that in the legal Monsanto-Mahyco Bt hybrids.   The cry 1 Ac gene has been 
extensively tested in India and abroad for biosafety.  For new approvals of Bt hybrids 
carrying this gene, Indian regulators do not require biosafety tests.  The state government, 
unconstrained by fears of environmental consequences, has made a choice according to 
straightforward political calculus.
20  
The pressures to enforce biosafety and IPR regulations may possibly be stronger 
in future years.  Since 2005 there have been some changes to strengthen the structure for 
enforcing biosafety regulations at the state and district level.  State and district level 
                                                 
20 There is a long-term concern , however, that if the expression of Bt toxin is weaker in some varieties of 
illegal seeds and particularly in the F2s, then that could speed up the evolution of bollworms resistant to Bt.  
Regulators require that farmers plant refuge (of non-Bt cotton) to slow the development of Bt resistant 
strains.  In our sample, a negligible fraction of growers plant refuge, irrespective of whether the Bt variety 
is legal or not.   
  27biosafety committees have been formed throughout India.  Firms are also starting to 
apply for plant variety protection.  In addition, new seed laws require that all new 
varieties  be registered and no longer allows the sale of unregistered but “truthfully 
labeled” seed.  To register their varieties, companies will have show the ancestors of their 
varieties and that the varieties themselves are distinct from other varieties that are already 
on the market.  This could cut down on copying of varieties and simply putting another 
name on them. In addition it will put in place another means of tracking varieties 
protected by the plant variety protection act.  
However, the Bt cotton episode illustrates a generic issue with IPRs.  While  
governments would like to establish IPRs, `de jure’ and  `de facto’, to attract private 
investment in agricultural R&D, they  have little incentive to enforce IPRs if the 
innovation is successful and promises large social gains with widespread adoption.  
Indeed, in the case of illegal Bt cotton seeds, which have proven in farmers’ fields to be 
as effective as the legal varieties, it is clearly not optimal to enforce the law and deprive 
farmers of a well adapted variety in the short run.  The federal structure of government 
where it is the task of the Central government to formulate IPR policies and the 
responsibility of State governments to enforce them makes the time consistency problem 
of IPRs more acute.  The illegal Bt seeds phenomenon is not the only instance where a 
State government has sought to erode the monopoly of legal seeds.  As mentioned earlier, 
in the 2006 season, the Andhra Pradesh government imposed price controls on legal Bt 
cotton seeds citing farmer complaints about their high price.   
 The reluctance of state governments to commit to  IPR protections, which are not 
optimal ex-post, will however affect the incentives of biotech firms to develop products.  
  28The more successful the innovation and more widespread is its adoption, the greater will 
be the pressure on local governments to compromise the ability of private investors to 
appropriate gains from them.  Kremer and Zwane (2004) advocate government buy-out 
of privately developed agricultural innovations that meet pre-specified criteria (for 
example, finger millet varieties that are resistance to blast – a fungal disease) where the 
reward to technology owners is proportional to the adoption of the product.  In principle, 
such “pull” programs could resolve the tension in IPRs between ex-ante and ex-post 
optimality.   
In the case of illegal Bt cotton seeds, a “pull” program would compensate the 
owners of the technology in relation to the social gains from the diffusion of illegal seeds.  
At the same time, the government could permit the Navbharat Bt cotton seeds and its 
variants to be evaluated for biosafety.  Legalization would allow the state to monitor the 
expression of Bt traits without depriving growers of well adapted hybrids.  The other 
social gain would be that the dissemination of the superior illegal seeds would no longer 
be constrained by the word-of-mouth advertising and the informal social networks of the 
underground seed economy.   
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Table 1:  Diffusion of Bt Cotton (million acres) 
 
























30 120  600  1200  2000  1800 
Total   58  210  1100  2500  5800  6600 
Source:  Santosh Singh  India Cotton and Products Annual 2007. USDA Foreign 
Agricultural Service GAIN Report Number: IN7041  5/15/2007 
 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of Principal Cotton Varieties in Survey 
Variety Name  Category  Proportion 
of area 
Sanju hybrid  Non-Bt Hybrid  1.41
Shankar 6  Non-Bt Hybrid   2.32
Shankar 8  Non-Bt Hybrid  5.95
Desi Gujarat 
23  Desi  5.71
Desi Desi  18.76
Sarthi  Illegal Bt hybrid  1.20
unknown Bt  Illegal Bt hybrid  2.96
Rakshak  Illegal Bt hybrid  3.44
NB 151  Illegal Bt hybrid  9.49
NB 151 - F2  Illegal Bt hybrid  20.34
Mahyco 162  Legal Bt hybrid  2.43
Mahyco 12  Legal Bt hybrid  7.35





  32Table 3: Group Comparisons: Land and Seed Source 
  
Non-
Bt  Legal Bt  Illegal Bt
As % of all cotton area  45 12  43
Size of cotton plot (acres)  7.85 4.45  5.25
Proportion of Area Irrigated  0.67 0.93  0.82
Proportion of area that is good soil quality  0.55 0.66  0.50
Medium soil quality  0.40 0.34  0.47
Bad Soil quality  0.05 0.00  0.03
Proportion of are that has seed sourced from seed dealer  0.42 0.82  0.17
Proportion of area that has seed sourced from state seed 
corporation 0.19 0.01  0.03
….from other farmers  0.14 0.11  0.56
     From saved seed  0.07 0.00  0.01




Table 4:  Grower Comparisons: Household Demographics 
 
  Non-Bt Legal Bt  Illegal Bt
Household Size  5.29 5.79  5.25
# Male adults  1.90 2.00  2.04
# Female adults  1.66 1.65  1.67
Propn of Male adults with <= 3 yrs of education  0.04 0.03  0.05
Propn of Male adults with > 3 yrs and <= 8 yrs of 
education 0.26 0.27  0.26
Propn of Male adults with > 8 yrs and <= 12 yrs of 
education 0.45 0.50  0.42
Propn of Male adults with > 12 yrs of education  0.25 0.20  0.27
Propn of Female adults with <= 3 yrs of education  0.07 0.05  0.08
Propn of Female adults with > 3 yrs and <= 8 yrs of 
education 0.38 0.41  0.34
Propn of Female adults with > 8 yrs and <= 12 yrs of 
education 0.27 0.24  0.26
Propn of Female adults with > 12 yrs of education  0.29 0.31  0.32
Age of Farmer (years)  45.43 45.88  47.70
Years of education of farmer  10.31 8.76  10.18
 
  33Table 5:  Plot Comparisons:  Input Use, Yield and Price 
 
 Plot  Type 
Item Desi 
Non-Bt 





Seed cost: Rupees/acre  42 317  1346 124  916 
# of pesticide sprays against bollworms 0.64 5.34  4.18  3.24  2.72 
# of pesticide sprays against sucking 
pests  0.54 5.05  5.21  5.51  4.89 
# of pesticide sprays against other pests 0.18 2.16  1.76  2.29  1.32 
Total # of pesticide sprays   1.36 12.55  11.15  11.04  8.94 
Fertiliser cost: Rupees/acre  93 2835  4764 2640 1645 
Yield (kgs/acre)  199 653  999  1148  734 
 
 
Table 6:  Responses to WTP Questions 
 
Legal Seeds 
WTP Responses  # of Growers
WTP > 1600 (Yes)  41
WTP > t  (No, Yes)  16
WTP < t (No,No)  101
Illegal Seeds 
WTP Responses  # of Growers
WTP > 1600 (Yes, Yes)  101
t < WTP < 1600 (Yes,No) 23
800 < WTP < t (No, Yes)  6
WTP < 800 (Yes, Yes)  27
 
 
  34Table 7:  Descriptive Statistics of the Correlates of Willingness to Pay 
 
Variables  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Farm Size (Acres)  16.36  14.91 
Farm Size squared (Acres squared)  488.55  1020.28 
Proportion of cotton area irrigated  0.75  0.41 
Proportion of cotton area that is of `good’ soil 
quality 0.55  0.49 
Age of Farmer (years)  46.99  11.79 
Dummy if education >= 9 years  0.59  0.49 
Dummy if grower took a crop loan  0.46  0.50 
Cotton area (Acres)  7.87  8.16 
Cotton area squared (Acres)  128.12  341.16 
Dummy for whether Navbharat grower  0.64  0.48 
Dummy for whether `desi’ grower  0.182  0.387 
Whether planted Bt in the past  0.37  0.48 
Dummy for whether grower sprayed pesticides,  0.86  0.35 
Dummy if pesticides were applied by family 
member 0.55  0.50 
Dummy if growers believe that insecticides have 
an impact on the environment  0.66  0.47 
Dummy if growers believe that insecticides have 
an impact of health of workers who apply it  0.46  0.50 
 
 








Farm Size  0.11 2.52  78.80
Farm Size squared  0.00 -2.50  -1.51
Proportion of cotton area irrigated  1.29 3.37  888.43
Proportion of cotton area that is of `good’ soil 
quality 0.52 1.93  358.82
Age of Farmer  -0.01 -1.25  -10.01
Dummy if education >= 9 years  -0.55 -2.23  -376.80
Dummy if grower took a crop loan  0.28 1.11  196.59
Cotton area  -0.09 -1.82  -63.24
Cotton area squared  0.00 2.20  1.84
Dummy for whether Navbharat grower  -1.03 -3.41  -711.05
Dummy for whether planted Bt in the past  0.60 2.41  414.21
Dummy for whether grower sprayed pesticides  -0.33 -0.66  -231.08
Dummy if pesticides were applied by family 
member 0.78 2.79  537.84
Dummy if growers believe that insecticides have 
an impact on the environment  0.72 2.32  497.29
Dummy if growers believe that insecticides have 
an impact of health of workers who apply it  0.23 0.80  158.86
Constant 0.03 0.03  20.14
(1/ ) σ   0.00145 2.63 ----
# of Observations  155 
Log-likelihood -94.11 
Mean Willingness to Pay  Rs. 778 
Median Willingness to Pay  Rs. 880 
 








Farm Size   0.03 1.81  47.31
Proportion of cotton area irrigated  0.60 2.06  1043.68
Proportion of cotton area that is of `good’ soil 
quality 0.31 1.29  532.41
Age of Farmer  -0.01 -0.95  -14.79
Dummy if grower took a crop loan  0.40 1.67  694.95
Cotton area   -0.03 -1.48  -59.36
Dummy for whether grower of `desi’variety -0.78 -1.75  -1349.22
Dummy for whether grower sprayed pesticides  -0.73 -1.55  -1274.07
Dummy if pesticides were applied by family 
member 0.33 1.29  582.23
Dummy if growers believe that insecticides have 
an impact on the environment  0.80 2.72  1394.03
Dummy if growers believe that insecticides have 
an impact of health of workers who apply it  0.54 2.03  945.94
Constant 0.96 1.37  1669.21
(1/ ) σ   0.00058 1.91  ---- 
# of Observations  154 
Log-likelihood -122.8 
Mean Willingness to Pay  Rs. 3050 
Median Willingness to Pay  Rs. 3028 
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